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nyone contemplating the elections in  May 2014 to the European Parliament cannot fail to have 
been struck by two contradictory phenomena. On the one hand, the continent seemed to have 
developed a recognizable and increasingly coordinated party political landscape of pan-
European party families spanning the former East–West divide. On the other hand, the results 
suggested that established parties and party systems across Europe were very visibly under 
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pressure from a variety of challenges. In Northern Europe socioeconomic malaise and 
democratic disconnect were often refracted through the politics of anti-immigration benefiting 
right-wing populists, while in Southern Europe anti-austerity parties of the radical left gained 
ground. Elsewhere voters backed loose, ideologically unplaceable, anti-political movements 
which claim to be replacements for political parties, such as Beppe Grillo’s Five Star 
Movement in Italy or the Yes (ANO) grouping of agro-billionaire Andrej Babiš in the Czech 
Republic. In much of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) voters simply stayed away from the 
polls in record numbers. The elections thus simultaneously posed two (possibly related) 
questions which have long preoccupied researchers: whether, just over a century after they 
emerged in modern form (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), European parties are still satisfactory 
vehicles for democratic representation and how, 25 years after the fall of communism, party-
based democracies in Central and Eastern Europe relate to those in older established West 
European states. 
As De Waele, Escalona and Vieira’s edited Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in 
the European Union makes clear, the appearance of a pan-European party landscape is not 
altogether illusory. Significant social democratic parties have emerged across the EU. The 
Socialists and Democrats faction in the European Parliament is the only group to include MEPs 
from every member state. The success and durability of social democracy, both historically and 
in contemporary Europe, De Waele, Escalona and Vieira suggest, has lain in its ability to 
respond to changing demands for the attenuation of market inequalities through social 
citizenship. Other questions – such as the relationship of social democracy to nationalism and 
the nation state; where social democratic parties should place themselves on the axis of social 
liberalism; and whether social democratic parties are workers’ parties or broad popular 
coalitions – have proved historically more divisive and less central to social democratic 
identity. However, as the editors note, these are the questions that have weighed most heavily 
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on social democracy. They are still acutely felt in contrasting social democrat responses to 
European integration, de-industrialization and the decline of the traditional working class, 
globalization and the rise of more fragmented, multicultural societies. Such multiple challenges 
, the editors conclude in their introduction, have set ‘social democracy … travelling along an 
inevitably downward electoral slope’ (De Waele et al. 2013: 21), losing votes to both the 
libertarian left and the radical right. 
The Handbook does not, however, seek to address these questions directly. Rather, it is 
a reference work and research resource consisting of short, standardized chapters by national 
specialists giving an up-to-date overview of social democratic parties in each of the 27 states 
of the pre-2013 EU. Country chapters cover the history, internal organization, election results, 
electoral and social bases, government participation and programmes of social democratic 
parties. The collection thus succeeds well in its objective of furnishing a panoramic overview 
of the extended social democratic party family, taking in both core West European states and 
less familiar cases in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the collection’s empirical breadth 
runs ahead of its analytical scope. Although a third of the book’s length is devoted to Central 
and Eastern European cases, both the editorial introduction and the short concluding essay by 
George Ross dwell heavily on the development and dilemmas of Western European social 
democracy. This is a pity. The origins of many Central and Eastern European social democratic 
parties as successors of former ruling communist parties sharply highlight the issues of 
historical adaptability that the editors rightly draw attention to. Moreover, the performance of 
social democracy in the region is clearly relevant to wider debates about its supposed decline. 
Based on most recent parliamentary election results reported by De Waele et al. (2013: 6–7), 
Central and Eastern Europe contained both the most and least successful social democratic 
parties in Europe. 
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CAN PARTIES TAKE THE STRAIN 
The capacities of parties in Europe to deliver democratic representation and the extent of 
democratic convergence between Western Europe and Eastern Europe are addressed in far 
more ambitious terms by Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s The Strain of Representation. The 
authors’ central concern is that the quality of party-based representation in Europe may be 
eroding, as parties struggle to reconcile the conflicting demands of voters with established party 
loyalties and the non-aligned independents, who make up a large and growing proportion of 
European electorates. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012: 27)conservatively estimate that 45 
per cent of West European voters and just under 54 per cent of Central and Eastern Europe 
voters are independent floating voters who do not identify with any party. 
The reasons for the rise of dealigned electorates in Europe are well known and well 
studied. In Western Europe dealignment has been driven by the long-term socioeconomic, 
cultural and technological changes that advanced post-industrial capitalism societies have 
undergone over the last half-century (Bardi et al. 2014; Kitschelt 1994, 1999; Kriesi et al. 
2008). Similar processes are now belatedly at work in Central and Eastern Europe following 
the region’s opening up to European and global markets in 1989. However, the predominance 
of floating voters in Central and Eastern Europe is more strongly attributable to the interruption 
of historical patterns of party development by communism and the subsequent failure of post-
communist societies to (re-)generate party identification on any scale after 1989 (Enyedi 2006). 
The relationship of partisan and independent voters to parties has also been well studied. 
However, as Rohrschneider and Whitefield note, this literature has generally assumed one of 
two quite different patterns of representation: dealignment models, which see voters essentially 
as customers in an electoral market and parties as political enterprises competing centripetally 
for the median voter; and partisan models, which view electorates as structured into distinct 
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constituencies with clear, stable sets of ideological preferences and party loyalties rooted in 
deep-running social divisions and well-established collective identities.  
What has been less well tested is the possibility that these two voter groups and models 
of representation may empirically coexist and the implications of this coexistence for party-
based democracy. Taken together, Rohrschneider and Whitefield pessimistically suggest, they 
may constitute a mechanism for inducing ‘representational strain’ on parties’ as they attempt 
to balance the diverging demands of partisan and independent voters to assemble winning 
electoral coalitions. Such strain, they argue, may be particularly acute when (as is now the case 
in both Western and Eastern Europe) numbers of partisans and independents are relatively 
balanced. 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield examine representational strain through a an ambitious 
cross-sectional comparison of parties, electorates and party system in 24 EU states, 14 in 
Western Europe and 10 in Central and Eastern Europe1 presenting data on 146 parliamentary 
parties (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 7–15). Unsurprisingly given its grand sweep, the 
book relies on survey-based and statistical methodologies, drawing on, cross-checking and 
integrating a range of data, including expert surveys on party positioning and organization, 
Comparative Manifestos Project coding, European Social Survey responses and previously 
published literature on parties. The bulk of the data is drawn from 2003–7 shortly after the 
EU’s eastern enlargement, but before the onset of the global recession and the eurozone crisis. 
They first investigate the ‘programmatism’ of parties, finding that parties in both Western 
Europe and (more surprisingly) Central and Eastern Europe offer coherent programmatic 
packages which broadly match their self-declared party (family) identity. They additionally 
find that party systems across Europe offer a range of programmatic positions – essential for 
meaningful competition, choice and accountability (Roberts 2010). Similar patterns of 
programmatism are also found among mass publics, both at the aggregate level (in national 
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electorates as whole) and within individual parties’ constituencies: voters have coherent sets of 
views which they relate to distinctions of left and right.  These are commonly understood in 
both halves of the continent in socio-economic terms.2  
In both Eastern and Western Europe, the authors find, however, that party positions are,  
structured in two dimensions: the first centring on distributional conflicts and the role of the 
state and the market, the second on social, moral and cultural issues. At the European level 
there is thus no single overarching left–right dimension. Nor is there any rigid association 
between parties’ left–right economic position and their positioning on liberal or conservative 
sociocultural issues.3 There is nevertheless an important caveat: Central and Eastern European 
parties’ views on currently contested issues can be simplified (through factor analysis) into a 
single dimension opposing a cluster of parties with socially and economically liberal views to 
parties with socially illiberal and economically statist views. Party systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe are thus merely ‘potentially two-dimensional’. Despite the formation of pan-
European party families – of which the social democrats analysed by De Waele, Escalona and 
Vieira and their contributors are perhaps the best example – 25 years after the fall of 
communism patterns of party-political division in Central and Eastern Europe have still not 
truly converged with those characteristic of Western Europe.</bi> 
CONVERGENT LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION 
Such regional non-convergence need not, however, mean that parties and their varying 
electorates are mismatched or that parties are subject to representational strain. To assess 
representational strain directly Rohrschneider and Whitefield measure the congruence of voter 
and party positions through two (sets of) measures: relative congruence, the correlation 
between a party’s ideological position and that of its supporters; and absolute congruence, the 
distance between a party’s position and that of its supporters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
2012: 103–4, 113). In broad-brush terms, they find a high degree of congruence between 
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European parties and their voters, with surprisingly little difference between Western and 
Eastern Europe. 
However, for representational strain relative congruence is less important than absolute 
distances between parties and voters and, in particular, the comparative distances between a 
party and its independent and partisan supporters. Using a variety of measures, Rohrschneider 
and Whitefield establish that parties across Europe have quite high levels of ‘absolute 
congruence’ but are, as might be expected. on average closer to partisan rather than 
independent supporters. These general patterns, however, obscure national variations which 
sometimes crosscut variations in institutional design, socioeconomic development and the 
East/West location in puzzling ways.4 On the whole, though, this shows the functioning of 
party-based democracy in an optimistic light. Certainly, the authors’ initial fears that the rise 
of non-aligned centrist electorates could empty party competition of programmatic content or 
reduce it to vacuous centripetal competition around valence issues are not borne out for either 
Western or Eastern Europe. Even in highly dealigned systems such as the UK there are, for the 
moment, sufficient numbers of partisan voters to anchor meaningful programmatic 
competition. 
There is, however, one striking cross-regional finding: that party–voter distances are 
slightly lower in new Central and Eastern European democracies than in Western Europe, 
suggesting that electorates in established European party systems generate greater 
‘representational strain’ than the generally more volatile electoral environments of post-
communist Europe (Tucker and Powell 2014). Moreover, when Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
examine the critical configuration that should exert the highest levels of representational strain 
– a situation where a party is closer to its partisans than to its independent supporters, and closer 
to its independent supporters than independents generally – they find it is much less prevalent 
in Central and Eastern Europe (50 per cent of parties) than in Europe as a whole (70 per cent 
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of all parties).  Similarly, having a strongly class- or confessionally based core electorate is 
also less strenuous for mainstream Central and Eastern European parties than for the moderate 
centre-left or -right parties in Western Europe, perhaps perhaps offering some clue as to why 
some social democratic parties in post-communist Europe do not seem subject to the patterns 
of decline that afflict their counterparts in older EU states.  
Why do electorates in long-established West European democracies generate higher 
levels of representational strain than those of the newer democratic systems of Central and 
Eastern Europe? Or, put in other words, how does Central and Eastern Europe achieve a quality 
of democratic representation comparable to West European democracies? Part of the answer 
to this ‘puzzle of equal congruence’, as Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012: 174) term it, lies 
in the greater complexity of party competition which operates in fully two dimensions in the 
diverse multicultural, post-industrial societies of Western Europe,. Such complexity poses 
formidable challenges to parties which need both to encompass such diversity and to simplify 
it into manageable lines of political competition.  
This diagnosis is confirmed when the authors examine the influence of national-level 
factors such as socioeconomic structure and institutional design on party–voter congruence. 
The design of national democratic institutions, whether inclining towards majoritarianism or 
consensus has little effect on individual parties’ levels of congruence.5 Congruence is, however, 
influenced by levels of socioeconomic and human development: where levels of development 
are higher, party–voter distances are greater and congruence lower.. What matters for the 
emergence of representational strain, Rohrschneider and Whitefield conclude, is not simply the 
emergence of a certain proportion of independent non-aligned voters but also the kind of 
independents that emerge. Poorer Central and Eastern European states may have large pools of 
unaligned independent voters,6 but their emergence is attributable more to the dislocating 
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legacies of communism than to the type of social fragmentation and value shift driving 
dealignment in the advanced West.</bi> 
ORGANIZATION MATTERS . .  
All this begs questions: how have political parties in Western Europe – supposedly declining 
institutions burdened by historical baggage of a now vanished Golden Age of mass politics – 
coped so well in such a challenging representational environment? The explanation, 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield hypothesize, may lie in (some) Western parties’ retention of 
substantial elements of mass organization which may help bridge the gap between partisans 
and independent voters. Central and Eastern European parties, by contrast, are normally viewed 
(with a few exceptions) as organizationally far weaker than those of core West European states 
(van Biezen 2003). Based on their expert survey data, however, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
(2012: 124) surprisingly find that ‘party organizations are nearly as developed in CEE as in 
WE [Western Europe]’ and even when parties are dichotomized into organizationally ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ groupings, the gap is small than might be expected.7  
<BI>It is only when testing whether elements of mass organization actually alleviate 
representational strain, that the authors find a regional difference. Their hypothesis is strongly 
confirmed in Western Europe. Western European parties with stronger ‘mass’ characteristics 
are closer to all types of voter even when factors such as party age, incumbency, ideological 
extremism and class base are controlled for. In line with the ‘partisan model’, mass 
organizational features thus ease the representational strains induced by the bifurcation of the 
electorate into partisans and independents and the opening up of multiple issue dimensions. 
This paints a relatively optimistic picture of the robustness, adaptability and responsiveness of 
traditional forms of party-based democracy in the old EU, which cuts against the grain of much 
of the party-decline literature.  
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However, the hypothesis is not borne out in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
‘congruence … – to the extent that it exists – is not helped at all by contemporary party 
organizations’ as ‘none of the regression coefficients for party organization gets even close to 
statistical significance’ (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 133, emphasis in original). This, 
as Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012: 136) note, ‘supports the argument that mass 
organizational forms found in CEE are “hollow shells” and support an interpretation that views 
the development of party organizations [in the region] as sui generis’.  
This implies an ominous future for party-based democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe, despite the programmatic character of parties and party–voter linkages in the region 
and the fact that Central and Eastern Europe parties currently appear to be working as effective 
mechanisms of representation. If social change in Central and Eastern Europe – driven by 
ongoing modernization and integration – follows the same pattern as that in Western Europe, 
it will exert the same types of representational strain as those found in Western Europe, leaving  
ineffective ersatz organizations in the region ill equipped to prevent the fragmentation of party 
systems. Indeed, for observers of the region it is tempting to see the succession of ‘earthquake 
elections’ in 2010–13 in previously stable Central and East Europe party systems such those 
of as Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary as the harbingers of such a process. 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s data on Central and Eastern European party organization 
is, however, relatively weak and some aspects of their findings are perplexing : it is difficult, 
for example, to square their assertion that Central and Eastern European parties have levels of 
organization comparable to those of Western Europe with the broader literature. Van Biezen, 
Mair and Poguntke (2012: 29), for example, concluded that the average level of party 
membership in Central and Eastern Europe was little more than half the 5.6 per cent average 
for Western and Southern European democracies and placed all Central and Eastern Europe 
states with the exceptions of Bulgaria, Slovenia and Estonia below the European average. These 
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limitations may reflect a degree of imprecision in the expert survey questions,8 suggesting a 
need for more sustained empirical research into party organisation in the region. 
In Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization Margit Tavits sets out to fill 
this gap. Her comparative study examines the extent to which strong organization affects the 
survival, success and cohesion of parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Given the patchiness 
of data across the region, she focuses on four national cases: the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Estonia, the first two representing (at the time the book was completed) relatively 
stable, predictable post-communist party systems, the latter two more fluid and changeable 
patterns.  
What does it mean to be an organizationally ‘strong’ party? Distilling the literature, 
Tavits offers a composite measure based on four indicators: professionalism of the central 
apparatus, extensiveness of the organizational network, membership size and levels of 
participation by parties of local elections (with numbers of candidates fielded seen as loose 
proxy for levels of activism). This overlaps closely with Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s 
conceptualization of (residual) mass party features,9 and, like Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 
Tavits finds such features empirically clustered, suggesting that organizational strength is a 
unitary phenomenon (Tavits (2013: 41). However, while Rohrschneider and Whitefield are 
largely confined to expert survey data, Tavits furnishes harder, more detailed evidence using 
electoral data at national and subnational levels, detailed analyses of local press and media and 
information from direct contacts with parties to assess party organization in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Pooling the results of 82 more stable parliamentary parties across elections in all four 
countries, she finds – even when controlling for variables such as resources and incumbency – 
that organization matters for political success: there is a significant and positive correlation 
between organizational strength and levels of electoral performance. This relationship also 
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holds up when parties’ electoral performance is compared within states across subnational 
units. Investigating this relationship in qualitative case studies, she argues that a focus on 
organization-building helps explain the survival of niche parties such as the Czech Communists 
(KSČM) or the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the successful emergence of the main centre-right 
Hungarian and Czech parties against earlier established rivals, the success of the Estonian 
Centre Party (K) against the ideologically similar Coalition Party (KE), and the ability of the 
Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD) in 1990s to move from minor to major party status.  
Tavits also finds that party organization correlates with levels of (parliamentary) party 
unity, suggesting that the electoral benefits that  a strong party organization brings dissuade 
legislators from defection or violating party discipline. Analysing rebellions and splits, she 
finds that organizationally stronger parties such as the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) and the 
Estonian Centre Party (KE) punish rebels more often and more severely than organizationally 
weaker groupings. Varying levels of organizational strength  also have impacts within parties: 
party branches with higher levels of grassroots organization wield more power than weaker 
branches, and the leaders of stronger branches enjoy greater levels of autonomy and visibility. 
This, she argues, leaves top national party leaders with a political dilemma over whether to 
invest in organization-building strategies: stronger overall, national party organization lead to 
greater party success and parliamentary cohesion, but will at the same time upset internal party 
dynamics by throwing up new challengers to established leaders. The dilemma is made more 
acute by the fact that the strongest branches in organizationally stronger parties appear to wield 
disproportionately more power.  
Variation in the strength of party organization, Tavits argues, can be explained by a 
combination (interaction) of three environmental factors, all of which increase the likelihood 
of party- building: pariah status, stemming from political extremism or being a former regime 
party (or both); having a hard-to-reach rural or small town electoral base; or  possessing a 
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greater preponderance of party leaders made up of ‘professional’ elites with skills and 
inclinations to build organization, rather than ‘amateurs’ who underestimate the need for party 
organization. 
. . BUT HOW AND WHEN 
In some respects, Tavits arrives at conclusions very similar to those of Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield. Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization makes a compelling case 
that party organization matters for the electoral success in Central and Eastern Europe and, like 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield, she concludes that accounts which dismiss the importance of 
building party organization on the grounds of changes in social structure or communications 
technologies are over-stated. Her reading of the utility of strong party organizations is virtually 
identical to that posited by Rohrschneider and Whitefield in their discussion of how ‘mass’ 
organization can ease representational strain. Greater organization and membership, both sets 
of authors agree, exercise their effects by: 1) cementing a loyal, core electorate; 2) acting as a 
channel for engagement and implantation in local communities; and 3) providing additional 
(human) resources for on-the-ground electoral campaigning. </bni> 
<BI>In other ways, however, their conclusions regarding Central and Eastern Europe appear 
diametrically opposed. While Rohrschneider and Whitefield see Central and Eastern European 
parties as organizationally ‘hollow shells’ when it comes to delivering representation, Tavits 
views them as highly effective in delivering electoral success and survival. There is, however, 
no necessary contradiction here. Central and Eastern European party organizations may help 
deliver voters, but they may deliver them in a form ill-matched to parties’ positions in terms of 
representational quality.  
The gap between the two books’ interpretations of the role of party organization in 
Central and Eastern Europe can also be narrowed by unpicking some of the broader claims in 
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Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization. The book argues that organizationally 
stronger parties can more ‘successfully overcome any crisis and survive as significant players 
than their organisationally weak counterparts’ (Tavits 2013: 195) and that parties’ 
organizational strength contributes to their institutionalization (Tavits 2013: 5–6, 198, 202). 
However, as Nicole Bolleyer (2013) has convincingly argued, electoral success, longer-term 
survival and the processes of deeper institutionalization are arguably quite different concepts 
which need to be measured in different ways. Small niche parties may be relatively electorally 
unsuccessful, but at the same time well institutionalized long-term survivors. Repeat electoral 
success of large parties, by contrast, may happen without any resulting institutionalisation.  
Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization tends to conflate such processes 
both theoretically and empirically, and its conclusions sometimes run ahead of the evidence it 
is able to marshal.10 Thus, while the suggestion that a strong organization helps Central and 
Eastern European parties survive crises and shocks is highly plausible, the book’s case study 
material – which focuses on early periods of party system formation – offers limited evidence 
that this is so. The subsequent electoral collapse of two of the successful, organizationally 
strong parties examined by Tavits, the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Hungarian 
Socialists (MSzP), suggests the relationship between organizational strength and party 
sustainability may be more complex than the book allows.  
Both books rest, in the end, on assumptions about the activism of Central and Eastern 
Europe party members, which seem more carried over from literature rooted in the West 
European and North American experiences than directly evidenced by the literature on the 
region itself. This is unsurprising. Existing studies of Central and Eastern European party 
organzation have focused heavily on forms, resources and formal rules (van Biezen 2003; 
Lewis 1996; Szczerbiak 2001), but left questions of Central and Eastern European parties’ real 
internal life and what their members and activists do from day-to-day and election-to-election 
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largely unprobed. The precise nature of Central and Eastern European parties’ organizational 
‘hollowness’ or (in)activity thus remains something of an open question.</bi> 
LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
<BNI>What are the longer-terms prospects for party democracy in Europe? Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield are careful not to overstate their conclusions about the robustness of West European 
party systems and parties. One limitation of their study, as they readily acknowledge, is that it 
essentially offers a cross-national, cross-regional snapshot which tells us little about trends in 
party organization and institutionalization. If West European parties can hold together diverse 
electorates by anchoring themselves in a declining core of loyal voters and remnants of mass 
organization inherited from a Golden Age of partisan politics, it does not mean they will be 
able to do so indefinitely. Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s findings thus qualify, but do not 
invalidate the findings of the party-decline literature about the erosion of traditional forms of 
party organization and the secular decline of party membership (van Biezen et al. 2012; Mair 
2013).</bni> 
Parties in Central and Eastern Europe are also dependent on a declining, hard-to-replace 
(if much weaker) legacy of inherited organizational assets  carried overfrom the communist 
period and the intense mobilization of 1989–90. This is a point overlooked in Post-Communist 
Democracies and Party Organization, which argues that classic perspectives on the path-
dependent formation of parties (Panebianco 1988) are inapplicable to Central and Eastern 
Europe as ‘parties emerged relatively simultaneously, with all possessing relatively similar 
resources’ (Tavits 2013:153; see also 196).  
Tavits is certainly right to stress the role of purposive action in Central and Eastern 
European parties’ organizational development and the mixed incentives faced by party leaders 
contemplating organization building. However, such a broad-brush dismissal of historical 
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legacies lacks credibility. Communist successor parties and their former satellites enjoyed 
marked organizational and resource advantages over parties emerging from the former 
opposition, precisely because of path-dependence and the legacies of the communist (and 
sometimes pre-communist) past (Lewis 1996). Moreover, many of the most significant parties 
of the post-communist right such as the Czech Civic Democrats also drew path dependently on 
the organizational and activist legacies of anti-communist civic mobilization in 1989–90 
(Hanley 2001).11 As in Western Europe, therefore, building organization or renewing ‘hollow’ 
party structures in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to be rendered more difficult by the 
unwinding of organizational legacies.  
What are the longer-term prospects for party-based democracy in Europe? Rohrschneider 
and Whitefield remain circumspect about the potential threat confronting party systems faced 
with the prospect of rising levels of ‘representational strain’. However, recent scholarship on 
Central and Eastern Europe, the region where such issues seem most sharply posed, suggests 
that the unnamed spectre that of major party system instabilities, and perhaps even the 
breakdown, failure or collapse of party-based representation (Bakke and Sitter 2013; Hanley 
and Sikk 2014; Haughton and Deegan-Krause forthcoming). 
Scholarship on parties and party systems rooted in the West European experience has 
viewed such breakdowns is such rare and unlikely occurrences that it can safely be dismissed 
as ‘a theoretical possibility lurking in the background, becoming a reality only in spectacular 
instances, such as the breakdown of the Italian party system . . . that can easily be dismissed as 
exceptional’ (Bolleyer 2013: 12). For a more worked-out theory of party system collapse, we 
thus need to look beyond Europe.  
In Latin America the collapse of relatively well-institutionalized party systems has been 
a more common and better-studied phenomenon. Although early analogies between 
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democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America were misleading (Bunce 1995), there are 
strong arguments that aspects of the Latin American experience – and, in particular, the impact 
of crisis on parties and their electorates – can usefully inform thinking about contemporary 
Europe (Hernández and Kriesi 2013; Rovira-Kaltwasser 2013). Jana Morgan’s Bankrupt 
Representation and Party System Collapse (2011) uses Latin American experiences and, above 
all, the Venezuelan case, to think through and formulate a theory of party system collapse.  
Party system collapse, Morgan argues, must be conceptually distinguished from related 
but less wide-ranging forms of instability such as party system change or the collapse and 
replacement of individual parties. It entails, she argues, the failure within a concentrated period 
of time – she proposes the span of two parliamentary elections – of all established parties and 
the accompanying transformation of underlying structures of party competition.  
Venezuela is chosen as, at least in a Latin American context, a ‘least likely’ case for party 
system collapse. Following the 1958 Punto Fijo Pact, which marked a break with a history of 
dictatorship and military strongmen, Venezuela had developed a well-institutionalized two-
and-half party system centring on the Christian Democratic COPEI and the social-democratic 
Democratic Action (AD). However, to the surprise of many, in the 1990s this seemingly well-
entrenched system crumbled within the space of a few short years in the face of social and 
political tensions triggered by declining oil prices and unpopular neoliberal reforms. Crisis 
elections in 1993 – following two unsuccessful military coups – saw a haemorrhaging of 
support for the two established parties, before the presidential elections of 1998 brought Hugo 
Chávez to power, marking the beginning of a quite different political era.  
The collapse of the old Venezuelan party system, Morgan argues, cannot simply be read 
as a salutatory tale about the destabilizing effects of (stop-go) neoliberal reforms and falling 
commodity prices. Although some form of exogenous shock or external constraint is usually 
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necessary for party system collapse, less well-institutionalized party systems, such as that of 
Argentina after 1998, successfully rode out much bigger crises. The key to the Venezuelan 
conundrum and the wider question of party system collapse, Morgan argues, is instead to be 
found in the across-the-board failure of party–society linkages as oil revenues dried up and 
major social change ensued, primarily taking the form of a huge expansion of the informal 
sector of the economy.  
The idea that parties subsist by maintaining links with voters and social (electoral) 
constituencies and die off when these links erode (Lawson and Merkl 1988) is hardly new. 
Morgan’s key insight, however, is to note that the stability and resilience of an established party 
or party system can rest on a complex mix of forms of linkage, which may combine 
programmatic, clientelistic and corporatist elements. Party system collapse, she claims, occurs 
when all forms of linkage simultaneously fail or fail in rapid succession across all major parties  
In Venezuela, she argues, programmatic linkage was broken when both major parties 
were confronted with the failure of old economic policy paradigms, avoided innovating 
ideologically and were thrown back on externally mandated neoliberal policies which 
contradicted their established social Christian and social democratic identities. The two parties’ 
predilection for cooperation and pacting – a key feature of the ‘Punto Fijo settlement’ – served 
to sever further programmatic links, with voters concluding that established parties offered no 
meaningful programmatic choice. 
Austerity and the rapid informalization of the Venezuelan economy also undercut 
established parties’ abilities to fall back on corporatist and clientelistic linkages. 
Informalization both drastically reduced the numbers of voters working in formal sector and 
marginalized traditional class-based interest organizations of peasants, employers and labour. 
Moreover, the conventional hierarchical structure of the two parties and their allied mass social 
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organizations left them poorly placed to organize the growing ranks of the urban precariat and 
unemployed.  
Finally, the possibility of using (or rebuilding) clientelistic networks was cut off by a 
sharp decline in public resources and by an exploding demand for patronage, which rapidly 
outstripped supply. Such demands were aggravated by the unintended consequence of earlier 
decentralization reforms intended to increase accountability. Instead political decentralization 
merely boosted demand for clientelistic resources by introducing a raft of expensive-to-fight 
subnational elections, while budgetary decentralization empowered local political bosses at the 
expense of national party leaders, further weakening party  structures. The stage in the process 
of party system collapse took the form of dual chain reactions: the crisis of one major 
established party placed additional burdens on others, while the failure of one form of linkage  
pushed additional (and unmeetable) demands onto other linkage strategies (as evidence  by the 
growing demand for patronage as programmatic differences between Venezuelan parties 
faded). 
Morgan tests her model of collapse in a series of paired comparisons of party systems 
under strain, some of which buckled, some of which endured: Venezuela (1992–8) versus 
Argentina (after 1998), Italy in the 1990s versus Belgium in the 1970s, Colombia versus 
Uruguay, and Bolivia (1985–2005) versus India in the 1980s. These contrasting cases, she 
argues, bear out her model of party system collapse as the simultaneous failure of multiple 
linkage forms brought on by the combined effects of external constraints on programmatic 
competition and rapid social transformation. Local variants on policy constraint (for example, 
preparation for the euro in Italy or US anti-drugs policies in Colombia) and cleavage change 
(the rise of regional or ethno-regional identities in Italy, Belgium, Bolivia and India; de-
industrialization in Belgium and Italy) stand in for the specifics of the Venezuelan case.  
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Where traditional party systems under extreme stress survive, they usually do so because 
one or more of the necessary conditions of fully blown collapse is absent. In some survival 
cases, however, specificities of traditional party organization, such as the Argentine Peronists’ 
and Radicals’ decentralized informal structures, also allow for successful  adaptation. 
Moreover, when a perfect storm does gather, politicians can still sometimes stave off party 
system collapse by resisting the temptation for anti-crisis pacting, grand coalitions or 
technocratic substitutes for party government. The presence in a party system of outsider 
parties, which can step into the gap left by the collapse of established parties, and the 
availability of resources allowing new forms of clientelism, Morgan suggests, may also  help 
tottering party systems avert total collapse . </bi> 
CAN INSTABILITY BE AVOIDED 
Not all aspects of Morgan’s theory-building comparison are convincing. Her account, for 
example, lacks any clear means of quantifying the relative weight of different linkage strategies 
and some cases appear shoe-horned into a model tailored around the Venezuelan experience. 
Her work nevertheless provides insights relevant to European party systems and, in particular, 
to potentially fragile party systems of Central and Eastern Europe. The first of these concerns 
the capacities and vulnerabilities of mass organizations. The rigid, over-institutionalized 
character of Venezuela’s mass parties was a source of both their long-time endurance and their 
ultimate demise, leaving them in the end brittle, unadaptable and vulnerable to collapse. This 
suggests that as organizations need to be viewed much more in terms of linkage and their 
adaptive capacities, than through formal, static measures of organizational strength or 
bulk.</bni> 
Secondly, although critics have argued that Morgan’s emphasis on socioeconomic change 
neglected public frustrations with corruption and poor governance (Seawright 2012), her 
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concept of parties as having a multifaceted ‘linkage portfolios’ offers useful a prism through 
which to consider European (and, in particular, East European) party systems. Although 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s concept of ‘partisan’ linkage and the inclusion of interest 
group links as a facet of mass party organization overlap to some extent with Morgan’s (2011: 
39–40) category of class-based ‘incorporation’, both The Strain of Representation and Post-
Communist Democracies and Party Organization stress programmatic linkage. Moreover, 
despite acknowledging their potential importance for party development in Central and Eastern 
Europe, both largely sidestep issues of clientelism and patronage.12  
Morgan’s work also invites us to rethink whether the complexity and hybridity of party–
voter linkage is a source of strength or weakness. Rohrschneider and Whitefield see West 
European parties’ need to manage the contending forms of linkage demanded by (class-based) 
partisan and independent voters as a source of strain. However, Morgan’s concept of ‘linkage 
portfolio’ suggests that (if it can be managed) it may be also a source of resilience. In this light, 
the straightforward programmatic demands placed on Central and Eastern Europe parties by 
their societies appear a source of potential weakness for party systems in the region, underlining 
the poverty of their ‘linkage portfolios’. Few, if any, Central and Eastern European parties, for 
example, could have recourse to ‘incorporation’ strategies as, with the possible exception of 
Slovenia, strong class-based mass organizations are absent in the region (and those socially 
rooted interest organizations that do exist are not aligned with parties) (Ost 2009).  
Patronage and clientelism appear to be a more viable additional linkage strategy for 
Central and Eastern European parties. Indeed, party exploitation of the state apparatus is 
already a feature of mainstream politics in the region (O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymała-Busse 2007; 
Kopecký et al. 2011) and, even allowing that parties’ have electoral incentives to build 
organizations, it is unclear why the two could not sit comfortably a single linkage portfolio. 
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Moreover, as in Latin America, decentralization and the expansion of regionally administered 
(EU) development funds appear to have bolstered resources for clientelism (Fazekas 2013). 
However, available evidence suggests that the clientelistic networks and practices of 
Central and Eastern European parties function at elite, rather than mass level (Grødeland 2007) 
and, with the possible exception of Romania and Bulgaria, serve as a means of securing 
political control and resources, rather than votes or members (Kopecký and Spirova 2011). 
Moreover, squeezed public budgets and the limited size of the rural and informal sectors in the 
region seem rule out the reinstatement of clientelism as a mass linkage strategy. Indeed, even 
elite-level clientelism is increasingly contested by new (would-be) reformist anti-corruption 
parties (Hanley and Sikk 2014) and grassroots-based protest movements (Ganev 2014).13  
In addition to having only a single, possibly precarious, form of (programmatic) linkage, 
Central and Eastern Europe already exhibits other  preconditions for party system collapse. The 
region’s small, export-oriented economies are susceptible to exogenous shocks and face 
external mandated fiscal constraints associated with (prospective) eurozone membership and 
EU deficit rules. As Rohrschneider and Whitefield ably show, unlike in Western Europe, there 
is also the potential for social change to transform the existing bases of party competition, 
opening up multiple dimensions of competitions. Politicians in the region have – recently in 
Bulgaria in 2013 – also proved adept at provoking popular wrath by sometimes forming 
inchoate left–right coalitions or hiding behind technocratic governments of exactly the type 
Morgan counsels against (Ganev 2013). 
There are, though, reasons to think that Central and Eastern Europe may avoid the spectre 
of full-blown party system collapse. Firstly, while the region’s small, open economies are 
potentially vulnerable, they are fiscally in better shape than Latin American states of the 1980s 
and 1990s and are to some extent cushioned by EU membership. It also remains an open 
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question whether the convergence of Central and Eastern European societies with advanced 
post-industrial Western Europe will be as rapid and unmanageable as the crisis-induced 
informalization of Venezuelan society in the 1990s. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that 
such a convergence will fully take place at all. In the judgement of some economists, the new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe will struggle to catch up socially and 
economically with the old, core EU and, in some cases, may never do so (Epstein 2014). 
Paradoxically, while failing to deliver on the long-term promise of EU enlargement, such a 
stalling of socioeconomic modernization might aid longer-term democratization, damping 
down levels of representational strain that wealthier, more complex societies generate. 
 Secondly, party system collapse, as Morgan defines it, appears empirically to be a 
predominantly Latin American phenomenon. This seems largely because it assumes a set of 
well-institutionalized parties as the object of collapse and high initial barriers to new party 
success. In Central and Eastern Europe, such conditions are largely absent. In contrast to 
Venezuela’s rigid two-and-a-half party system or the ‘degenerated consociationalism’ of 
Italy’s outwardly polarized post-war politics, much of Central and Eastern Europe has volatile 
and open party systems with a plentiful supply of challenger parties. Indeed, in some states it 
is questionable whether there was ever sufficient ‘systemness’ of parties and interparty 
competition to qualify them as party systems at all (Lewis 2006). Such dynamics have grown 
more marked in the region in recent years with repeat breakthroughs by new anti-establishment 
parties, even in states where party politics seemed more consolidated. Party system collapse, 
as Morgan defines it, thus seems precluded in Central and Eastern Europe by the prevalence of 
lower-level forms of instability and volatility, including the collapse of individual parties and 
the emergence of cycles and ‘subsystems’ of protest voting for short-lived anti-establishment 
parties (Hanley and Sikk 2014; Haughton and Deegan-Krause forthcoming). 
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The composite picture that emerges is one of enduring regional difference. Conditions in 
Western and Eastern Europe and, less surprisingly, Europe and Latin America remain distinct 
– as do challenges to established party systems and principles of party representation. While 
cross-regional lessons can be drawn, they are not straightforward. Distinct, however, need not 
mean discrete. As Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012: 178) observe ‘in a single Europe, 
especially one that strives to be economically and politically integrated, representational 
challenges cannot be regionally isolated’. Processes of party political ‘contagion’ and 
emulation can quickly make themselves felt across diverse regions, as the spread of social 
democracy into post-communist Europe illustrates. Patterns of political and economic 
interdependence in Europe are such that the failure of mainstream party representation in one 
part of the continent would certainly have repercussions elsewhere. 
The authors of the three monographs contemplate the potential failure of democratic 
representation through programmatic parties to varying extents. Tavits (2013: 198), writing 
before the turbulent ‘earthquake elections’ in Central and Eastern Europe, thinks in terms of 
the growth of democratic consolidation, achievable inter alia through investing in party 
organization building. Rohrschneider and Whitefield have a keener sense of the vulnerabilities 
of party-based democracy in Europe (the ‘party representation model’) – whether from a slide 
into extreme centripetal competition or the growth of voter–party incongruities – but do not 
look beyond it. Morgan (2011: 287–94) looks furthest over the horizon, seeing a world of 
loosely structured, personalized politics, part Berlusconi and part Chávez, which contains both 
the seeds of democratic renewal and a descent into authoritarianism. All, three writers, 
however, in different ways highlight that the normal state of political parties is one of 
mutability and adaptability – and that, if their strength lies anywhere, it lies in this protean 
quality.  
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NOTES 
1 Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus are excluded, as is Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013. 
2 Western European voters with left-wing economic views, however, tend to have liberal 
views on social issues, while no such linkage exists in Central and Eastern Europe.  
3 Party stances on European integration, however, cannot easily be integrated into these 
two dimensions, although in Central and Eastern Europe there is an association between 
pro-integration and socially liberal stances.  
4 Thus Finland and Sweden have high levels of absolute congruence – as do newer Central 
and Eastern European democracies such as Hungary and Bulgaria – while in other West 
European states such as Austria, Belgium and Portugal it is lower. 
5 Institutional effects are confined to the tendency of majoritarian forms of democracy 
(measured through district magnitude) to promote congruence with independent voters in 
wealthier states with large numbers of independent voters.  
6 In Western Europe, only the UK, Ireland, Germany and Spain had majorities of independent 
voters. 
7 69 per cent (51/74) of West European parties and 51 per cent of Central and Eastern 
European parties (30/59) were categorized as ‘strong’ (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 
130). 
8 Experts were asked to rate (on a seven-point scale whether) parties in their country of 
expertise had a ‘significant’ membership based on a loose distinction between ‘parties that 
have a few members and those with relatively large numbers’. They were also asked to rate 
the extent of parties’ ‘organizational affiliation’ with civil society or interest groups and the 
relative importance in decision-making of each of the three ‘faces of party’ (membership, 
                                                          
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
apparatus and parliamentary caucus) (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 120–4). For West 
European parties, responses were cross-checked with more empirical data on party 
organization. No similar exercise was attempted for Central and Eastern Europe.  
9 Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012: 118) see mass organization as a triad of: 
organizational centralization and strong party apparatus, relatively large membership, and 
links with civil society organizations. 
10 For example, although mentioned throughout the book, the concept of party 
institutionalization is discussed only briefly (Tavits 2013: 6–7) and presented largely as the 
consequences of organizational strength making little reference to large wider literature on 
the topic. 
11 The book’s attempts to reduce party-building strategies to the organizational style and 
varying ‘cognitions and behaviors’ (Tavits 2013: 164) of ‘professional’ or ‘amateur’ elites are 
also problematic. Anyone familiar with Czech politics, for example, will find the categorization 
of the Czech Social Democrat leader and prime minister Vladimír Špidla as an ‘amateur’  but 
his successor Jiří Paroubek as a ‘professional’ somewhat contrived. Both were long-standing 
career politicians with similar executive experience in public administration, who differed 
mainly in their political priorities and levels of internal party support. Similarly, the 
categorization of ‘amateurs’ as ideological purists indifferent to organization building and 
‘professionals’ as non-ideological party-building pragmatists breaks down for many of the 
region’s most significant politicians. Václav Klaus and Viktor Orbán, for example, combined 
commitments to party organization with aggressive promotion of new right-wing ideologies. 
Arguably organization- and ideology-building often go hand in hand.  
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12 Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012: 37 n. 15) note that ‘parties in CEE states may base 
their appeal more on the charisma of leaders or on clientelistic relationships’ but see this as 
‘beyond the main concern of the current study’. Tavits (2013: 48, 157) argues that the effect 
of clientelism on electoral success is ambivalent, but concedes that parties with poorer, more 
rural electorates may use it to build their organizations. However, she does not engage further 
with the issue because clientelism is ‘almost impossible to capture empirically’ (Tavits 2013: 
48). She uses incumbency as a rough proxy for patronage opportunities (Tavits 2013: 48).  
13 As Morgan (2011: 172–4) astutely notes, mass electorates in Venezuela become actively 
concerned about corrupt clientelistic linkages – and embraced the rhetoric of anti-corruption 
– only when these networks began to break down and ceased to deliver benefits. It is unclear 
if there are parallels in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe.  
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